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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

:
:

MICHAEL DON PETERSON,

Case No.
14720

:

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Michael Don Peterson, appeals from
a judgment entered against him in the Fourth Judicial
District Court of Utah, the Honorable George E* Ballif,
presiding, following a conviction for Forcible Sexual Abuse.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was tried before the Honorable George E.
Ballif, sitting with a jury.

The jury returned a verdict

finding the appellant guilty of Forcible Sexual Abuse, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1953), as amended.
The judgment, sentence and commitment were entered.
the action of the trial court the appellant appeals.
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From

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict and
judgment of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 24, 1976, at approximately 9:00
p.m., Mrs. Sandy Murphy, an Orem resident, was attacked
sexually as she walked home from a church meeting.

A

man, later identified as appellant, approached her from
behind, put his hand over her mouth, pushed her to the
ground and put his hand under her dress, coming in
contact with her genitals, through her underwear (T.9).
Mrs. Murphy screamed and struggled and the assailant
ran off (T.ll).
On the evening of April 7, 1976, appellant .
was approached by a police officer while he was out
walking (T«21).

The police officer asked for his

identification, found that he matched the description
and name of a person being sought for questioning,
and asked appellant to accompany him to the police
station for questioning (T.22).
In the course of the evening, appellant
gave a statement admitting that he was the man who had
attacked Mrs. Murphy, and that he had done it out of
sexual desire (T.32,33).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respondent submits that at no time was defendant
illegally arrested or detained.

He went freely with the

police when he was first stopped and voluntarily stayed
at the station during questioning.

Nothing in the

transcript indicates that appellant thought he was
under arrest or was being forcibly detained.
Since appellant was not arrested or forcibly
detained before or during questioning, the complaint
that appellant was falsely arrested is invalid and
questions asked in hope of supporting that theory were
immaterial.

Therefore, an objection to a question

relating to the other crime for which appellant was
also a suspect was properly sustained.
This question of whether defendant was arrested
or went by consent to the station was twice answered by
the trial court, once at suppression hearing prior to
the trial and once at the trial itself (T.25).

The

trial court had ample opportunity to review the facts
and consider appellant's position in this regard.

Such

a well founded decision of the trial court should not
be disturbed.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING
APPELLANT'S ORAL TESTIMONY TO BE ADMITTED AS
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL.
As outlined in Point I above, respondent
submits that appellant was not illegally detained
at the time he made his admission as to his attack
on Mrs. Murphy.

Appellant's rights were carefully

explained to him at least three times while he was
at the police station (T.27,31).

He waived his right

to have an attorney and said he would talk freely to
the county attorney (T.31).
The police questioning was not excessive or
coercive.

He was asked about his whereabouts on the

evening in question and his explanation of the attack
on Mrs. Murphy.

Contrary to appellantfs allegations,

the officers who were present during questioning
testified they did not suggest phrases to appellant
(T.37,43).

The officer read a couple of sentences

from the report and asked appellant if they were
true only after appellant had given a full explanation of his account of the incident (T.37).

Such

thoroughness should not be a reason for suggesting
that appellant•s statment was involuntary.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The fact that appellant may have a lower
intellectual ability than general adult population
should not be an automatic cause for excluding his
admissions either.
In State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59 * 296 P.2d
726 (1956) , the defendant was suspected of murdering
her husband and was taken in for questioning immediately
after the funeral.

After five and one half hours of

questioning, she admitted to having committed the
crime.
This Court described that defendant as "a
person of limited education and was naturally emotionally upset at the time of questioning."

But in

sustaining the admission of this confession, the Court
said:
"Manifestly, the will of a
person who is of tender age or of weak
intellect may be more easily overcome
than that of one who is more mature
or more intelligent* This alonef
however, will not render a confession
inadmissible and if the confession
was obtained in a manner and by such
methods as are consistent with the
proper detention of crime and determination of guilt, then our duty is
to sustain the trial court." Id. at
729.
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In accord:

People v. Lara, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d

202 (1967) (mental subnormality of accused only one
factor considered in deciding voluntariness of
confession).
Even if it could be adequately proven that
this lower intelligence did make appellant more
persuadable than a normal adult, the facts do not
suggest that those who questioned him took advantage
of this factor.
A careful study of the facts will show that
the factors mentioned in appellant's brief, taken
individually or collectively, present no indication
that the appellant was forced, or unduly persuaded, to
answer questions or make his admission as to the attack
on Mrs. Murphy.

His presence at the station was

voluntary, his rights were explained, the questioning
was proper, both in form and content, his lower
intellectual abilities were not preyed upon, and no
means of threats or force were used.

His voluntary

admission was valid and was properly admitted into
evidence.
The Court in State v. Ashdown, supra, spoke
decisively about affirmation of trial court's findings
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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in such an instance:
" . . . [A]fter the trial court
has decided from the evidence that
the confession was voluntarily made,
the appellate court will not disturb
the finding in the absence of a showing
of abuse of its discretion where there
is substantial evidence from which it
could reasonably so find." Id. at 729.
Substantial evidence of voluntariness exists
in the present case and this decision should be upheld.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT GRANTING A
MISTRIAL BASED UPON CROSS-EXAMINATION OF APPELLANT'S
WIFE.
Appellant argues that the county attorney was
guilty of misconduct by asking the appellant's wife, on
cross-examination, if appellant had ever been convicted
of a felony involving dishonesty. A close reading of the
Utah Rules of Evidence, however, will clearly show that
such questioning was permissible.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 21, states: 7.:/;
"Evidence of the conviction of
a witness for a crime not involving
dishonesty or false statement shall
be inadmissible for the purpose of
impairing his credibility, except
as otherwise provided by statute."
(Emphasis added,}

-8-
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This Rule specifically excepts crimes of dishonesty and false statement from its prohibition against
admission of evidence of crimes.

Therefore, such evidence

of crimes of dishonesty can be admitted under Rule 20,
which states:
"Subject to Rules 21 and 22, for
purpose of impairing or supporting the
credibility of a witness, any party
including a party calling him may
examine him and introduce extrinsic
evidence concerning any statment or
conduct by him and any other matter
relevant upon the issues of credibility."
(Emphasis added.)
Examining other witnesses as to their knowledge
of a conviction of a certain witness for a crime of
dishonesty is within the scope and purpose of this Rule.
Since appellant had taken the stand prior to the crossexamination in question, he had become a witness and his
credibility was susceptible to this type of attack.
Rule 26(f) of Alaska's Rules of Criminal
Procedure is very similar to Rule 21 of Utahfs Rules
of Evidence.

Rule 26(f) says that for purpose of attacking

credibility of witness, evidence that the witness has been
convicted of a crime is only admissible if the crime
involved dishonesty or false statement.

The Alaska

Supreme Court acknowledged this as a valid exception to
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the general rule that evidence of crimes is not admissible
in Galauski v. State, 527 P.2d 450 (1974), when it stated:
". . .[E]vidence of convictions
for crimes involving dishonesty is
admissible to show that a witness1
testimony is unworthy." 1x3. at 467.
For the same reasons, the questioning of Mrs.
Peterson was permissible.

Even if such questioning of

Mrs. Peterson by the county attorney was somehow improper,
it is totally a matter of conjecture that this one question
caused the jury to be prejudiced against the appellant.
Since the questioning was terminated even before an answer
had been given, this questioning, if error, must be deemed
harmless error since it did not have ". . . a substantial
influence in bringing about the verdict or finding,"
and this is required if a verdict is to be set aside
for reason of erroneous admission of evidence.

Utah Rules'

of Evidence, Rule 4.
POINT IV
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED THAT APPELLANT
TOUCHED THE PLAINTIFF'S GENITALS AND OTHERWISE TOOK
INDECENT LIBERTIES AND THUS THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
WERE PROVEN.
-10-
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Appellant suggests that since the evidence
shows that there was a layer of clothing between
Mrs* Murphy's genitals and appellant's hand, that he
did not "touch" the genitals in the statutory sense
of the word.

To accept such a limited definition of

the word would distort the ordinary meaning of the
word and would unduly limit the legislative intent
of this statute*
One can "touch" another's hand even though
the other person is wearing gloves*

A person can

"touch" or hold an arm of another even though it is
covered by a sleeve of a coat.

Such is common use and

understanding of the word "touch" and such usage should
be applied in the present case*
The legislature did not give this word a
special definition in the statute in question.

The

required specificity needed to properly define the
purpose of the statute is supplied by the intent
required in order for someone to be guilty of forcible
sexual abuse.

It seems evident that if one touches

the genitals of another with the intent to satisfy \>
sexual desire, even though the area he touched was

-11-
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covered by the victim's underwear, he is guilty of the
very thing which the legislature proscribed in this
statute.
Assuming, arguendo, that this technicality
does prohibit appellant's actions from being seen as
"touching" of another's genitals, he has taken "indecent
liberties" under any definition*

The evidence presented

established that appellant invaded a woman's body by
forcing her to the ground and putting his hand up
her dress for the satisfaction of sexual desire.

Such

evidence is clearly sufficient to establish that
appellant was guilty of forcible sexual abuse as
defined by the statute.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT ADMITTING
TESTIMONY REGARDING APPELLANT'S SPECIFIC BEHAVIOR.
Appellant called Barbara Batty to the stand
to testify as a character witness in appellant's behalf.
Appellant's counsel questioned Mrs. Batty as to
appellant's behavior towards her when neither of
their respective spouses were present.
prosecutor objected (T.82).

The

After some debate on

the legal issue of the admissibility of such evidence,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Court sustained the objection (T.83-85).
Appellant cites Rule n of the Utah Rules of
Evidence as authority for his position.

However, Rule

47 is quite specific in defining what evidence will be
allowed in the area of character traits.

It reads in

part:
". • . (b) in a. criminal action
evidence of a trait of an accused's
character as tending to prove his
guilt or innocence of the offense
charged . • . may not be excluded by
the judge . . . if offered by the
accused to prove his innocence. . . ."
In order for evidence to be admissible under
this Rule, it must go directly to the character trait
which is in question.

It is difficult to see how

evidence that appellant does not make sexual advances
to a woman with whom he and his wife are good friends and
with whom he and his wife frequently socialize with, has
any probative value of determining if he would sexually
attack a strange woman on the street at night.
Any connection which this evidence may have to
prove or disprove the trait in question is far too
indirect to be relevant.

As the note under Rule 4n

states, "The admission or rejection of character evidence
depends primarily on the court's conception of its
relevancy."

The conception of the trial court in this
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case was that such evidence was too remote and therefore
inadmissible.
An analogous situation existed in State v.
Fairbanks, 171 P.2d 845 (1946).

The defendant in that

case was charged with taking indecent liberties with
a female under the age of fifteen.

The defendant called

a witness to try and establish that the defendant was in
the habit of calling upon young girls to answer telephone
calls in the office.

Presumably such evidence was

offered to show that since the defendant had not taken
indecent liberties with these girls, he did not have
the character trait to take indecent liberties with
the girls in question.

The Washington Supreme Court

flatly rejected this argument on appeal.

It said:

"We fail to perceive any
materiality of the evidence indicated
by the questions. If it was designed
to show that appellant was a man of
good character, it was incompetent."
Id. at 848.
The excluded evidence in the present case was
likewise incompetent and irrelevant.

The trial court's

well-supported decision on its exclusion should be
affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, respondent respectfully
requests that the conviction of the lower court be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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